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Introduction – The Case of the Industrial City: 
 
 Northeast Minneapolis in the winter time is as bleak a scene as any that Dickens ever 
penned.  Standing on the street there, in the cold and the gray half-light, one sees boarded up 
warehouses and gutted buildings.  Above, a dim sodium lamp burns yellow, not so much 
illuminating the street as differentiating between dark shadows and darker shadows.  In the 
distance is the smokestack of a smelter, billowing out a toxic black.  The snow falls like ash and 
one wonders how and why the city wound up in this grim state.  This is a city of the 20
th
 century 
with which the 21
st
 does not know what to do. 
 Hyperbole aside, I began with a Dickensian introduction because industry is so often 
negatively connoted.  Common descriptors associated with industry are ‘polluting’, ‘blighting’, 
‘toxic’, and ‘hazardous’.  Industrial disasters - tragedies around the world from Love Canal to 
Bhopal - have rightly caught public attention.  No one ever wants an industrial disaster to occur 
in the place they call home, but assessing and preventing that risk is neither simple nor 
straightforward.  For one group, preventing disaster might seem like inviting it from the 
perspective of another group.  Conflicts arise, therefore, in the building of cities that pit the 
ideologies and arguments of these groups against one another.  This paper examines the case of 
one such conflict in Northeast Minneapolis, Minneapolis, Minnesota and establishes a motive 
and a mode for the actions of each group.  This is the case of the Household Hazardous Waste 
Facility.  To understand the case though, it is first necessary to understand the background of the 
case. 
 Land use in Northeast Minneapolis is characterized by dense industrial development in 
close proximity to residential properties.  Northeast Minneapolis contains the majority of 
industrial land usage in the city of Minneapolis, and as the rest of the city has experienced 
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deindustrialization and the relocation of industries towards the periphery of the metropolitan area, 
the concentration of industrial land use in Northeast Minneapolis relative to the rest of the city 
has become more acute.  (Truax, 2009)  Compounding this acuteness is the obligation of the city 
to provide certain basic services, such as waste management, that must be fulfilled at a municipal 
level and cannot be redistributed outside of the city.  Consequently, the available places where 
such activities can be located diminish due to rezoning, and Northeast Minneapolis has become 
the most prominent site for this intra-urban redistribution of industry.  The maps on the following 
pages illustrate this geographic trend.  Map 1 illustrates the distribution of industrial properties in 
the city of Minneapolis; Map 2 focuses in on the industrial properties of Northeast Minneapolis 
in particular; Map 3 illustrates the proximity of residents throughout Minneapolis to industrial 
property; and Map 4 highlights the close proximity of Northeast Minneapolis residents to 
industrial land use.  These last two maps in particularly demonstrate the geographical disparity of 
industrial distribution, and how Northeast Minneapolis residents live in relative proximity to 
industrial land use compared to residents elsewhere in the city.  Residents in Northeast 
Minneapolis have begun to notice a growing, intangible sense that their livelihoods are being 
impacted by industrialization more so than residents in other parts of the city.  Trepidatious, 
residents have begun to oppose efforts of further industrialization, beginning with their objection 
against the household hazardous waste facility – the subject of this case study.  (WPCIA, 2009) 
3
Truax: Triumph against the machine
Published by DigitalCommons@Macalester College, 2010
4 
 
 
 
 
Map 1 – Industrial Properties in Minneapolis, Minnesota 
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Map 2 – Industrial Properties in Northeast Minneapolis 
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Map 3 – Proximity of Minneapolis residents to Industrial land use 
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Map 4 – Proximity of Northeast Minneapolis residents to Industrial land use 
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  This paper focuses on the particular case of a household hazardous waste disposal and 
transfer facility
1
 that was planned to be built in Northeast Minneapolis between 2004 and 2009.  
The HHW facility was put forward by the city of Minneapolis and Hennepin County as a means 
of providing residents greater geographic accessibility for HHW disposal.  Household hazardous 
waste includes any sort of hazardous waste normally found in a home, such as house paint, lawn 
chemicals, plumbing chemicals, and the like.  It cannot be disposed of with non-hazardous 
household waste, except during special neighborhood pick-up events.  Beyond these events, 
HHW must be disposed of by residents at specific facilities, such as the one planned by the city.  
(City of Minneapolis, 2004a) 
 The specific motivations and processes the city undertook are analyzed later in this paper, 
but the city proposed the facility to mitigate risk to the exchange value of the land in Northeast 
Minneapolis.  Residents, on the other hand, reacted to the proposal in opposition.  An HHW 
facility, zoned by the city in the most intensive industrial land use category, would have 
negatively impacted the use value of their land
2
.  In the end, the plan was mothballed following a 
decision by the site owner not to sell the property to the city of Minneapolis.  These introductory 
facts beg answers for larger questions however.  How did the city put forward its plan to build 
the HHW facility, and why did it choose Northeast Minneapolis as the site of the facility?  Why 
did it want a facility to dispose of HHW at all, for that matter?  Why did residents oppose the 
facility, and how is this opposition justifiable or not justifiable?  How does this ‘victory’ of use 
value over exchange value contribute to understanding larger processes at work around the 
country and the world today? 
                                                     
1
 Referred to hereafter as ‘the HHW facility’ or ‘the facility’. 
2
 The concepts of use versus exchange value of land will be defined and discussed later, in the literature and theory 
section of this paper. 
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 With these questions in mind, I argue the thesis that the city of Minneapolis, as a non-
resident actor, put forward the plan for the HHW facility in the interest of furthering value-free 
growth to increase the city’s return on exchange value through taxes.  Furthermore, I argue that 
residents’ objections to the facility were justifiable because their tie to the use value of the land 
would be at risk if the city built the facility.  Expanding on this thesis requires the background 
documentation of the case, an examination of relevant theory, and a critical analysis of the case 
in relation to theory. 
 Consequently, this paper is organized into four sections.  The first section puts forward 
the data collected for this paper and the methods used to analyze the case.  The second section 
reviews the relevant literature on the theories of the political economy of place, NIMBYism and 
environmental justice, to establish a framework for understanding the specifics of this case.    
The third section analyzes the data of the case through the lens of theory, proving the thesis 
above.  The fourth section concludes the paper with an assessment of the significance of this 
research bears on understanding the political economy of place perspective. 
 
Data and Methods – Putting Together the Case: 
 
 
 In putting together this case study, I have relied on documents from the city of 
Minneapolis, primarily from the Transportation and Public Works Committee, which is 
responsible for overseeing infrastructural projects in the city such as the HHW facility plan.  In 
addition to those city documents, I have relied on my previous research into industrialization in 
Northeast Minneapolis which was conducted in the fall of 2009 for the Windom Park Citizens in 
Action (WPCIA) organization.  The WPCIA were the primary actors in agitating against the 
HHW facility, and I have also drawn upon their meeting minutes that have dealt with the HHW 
9
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facility.   Tying these sources together creates a narrative for describing the steps taken by the 
city and residents in relation to the plan. 
 The case of the HHW facility in Northeast Minneapolis came to be in January 2004, 
when the city of Minneapolis put forward a plan to build a household hazardous waste facility in 
the city.  The reason behind this decision was, the city argued, that participation in HHW 
management is inversely correlated to the distance traveled to dispose of HHW, and since 
Minneapolis residents have a lower rate of automobile ownership than residents in surrounding 
suburbs, an HHW facility in the city would encourage greater participation.  (City of 
Minneapolis, 2004a)  Prior to this, residents were able to dispose of HHW at a transfer station in 
South Minneapolis off of Hiawatha Avenue, which was then taken to one of the two HHW 
facilities to the north and south of the city, operated by Hennepin County.  (City of Minneapolis, 
2004b)  Map 5 illustrates the distribution of participation in HHW management across Hennepin 
County.  It shows that indeed Minneapolis has a low percentage of people participating in HHW 
management, while residents who live in areas closest to the HHW facilities north and south of 
the city participate in greater numbers according to proximity. 
10
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Map 5 – Distribution of participation in HHW management across Hennepin County (credit: City of Minneapolis) 
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 In 2006, the city sold this transfer station in South Minneapolis to the Green Institute for 
use as a biomass heat and power station.  At the same time, it began investigating possible sites 
for constructing a new HHW facility.  (City of Minneapolis, 2004c; ibid. 2006d)  The first site 
under consideration was a property in the SEMI district of Northeast Minneapolis off Malcolm 
Avenue.  This Malcolm Ave site was negotiated for and purchased by the city, and is currently in 
operation as a waste disposal facility; though not currently accepting HHW disposal, this facility 
is slated to accept HHW in the future.
3
  (City of Minneapolis, 2006e)  Having already purchased 
one site, the city then proceeded to examine possible sites for a second facility.  The site chosen 
was off of Industrial Boulevard in Northeast Minneapolis, in the Mid-City Industrial District.  
(City of Minneapolis, 2008b)  This is the site in question for this case study.  The site was 
formerly owned by Macy’s, and then by a bottling company, but the current property owner 
leaves the site vacant.  The decision to site the facility here came because the facility is limited to 
an I-3 zone, or a general industry zone.  Northeast Minneapolis has the highest abundance of I-3 
zones in the city, but by no means are they exclusive to this area.  Beyond this, the facility is part 
of a larger industrial redevelopment plan which is centered on revitalizing industry in Northeast 
Minneapolis while changing industrial land uses elsewhere to mixed commercial and residential 
developments.  (City of Minneapolis, 2006a; Truax, 2009)  This answers the first research 
question of this paper, of how the plan came to be put in place. 
 Upon learning about the proposed plan, residents in the Windom Park neighborhood of 
Northeast Minneapolis began to investigate the nature of the facility.  Neighborhood group 
meeting minutes reveal residents’ reactions towards the facility, citing as opposition an over-
abundance of industry already present in Northeast Minneapolis, as well as concerns that the 
                                                     
3
 Because the facility at Malcolm Ave is not accepting HHW at this time, it does not factor in significantly to this 
case, other than as background information. 
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facility would lead to increased traffic, among other impacts.  (WPCIA, 2009)  Among these 
other impacts was a growing unease among residents about the risk posed by the concentration 
of industrial properties in Northeast Minneapolis and the negative environmental impact they 
caused.  (Truax, 2009)  In reaction to these concerns and in the spirit of residents’ concerns, the 
property owner of the Industrial Blvd site declined to sell the property to the city.  As a 
consequence, the plan for the HHW facility was mothballed.  This research is limited in its scope 
since exact causes of why the property owner did not sell to the city could not be investigated. 
 How did this happen?  The path this case has followed is simple to describe.  The city 
wanted to increase collection of household hazardous waste by siting a facility in Northeast 
Minneapolis where it would be easy to access by residents without cars.  The residents there 
objected because the facility was further unwanted industrial development which put them at risk.  
In turn, the property owner decided not to sell to the city, and the plan was ended.  Why did this 
happen though?  This is not a simple question to answer.  To do so, the case must be understood 
through a framework of theory which elaborates on how different actors prioritize the value of 
their land, and mitigate the risks to those values. 
 
Literature and Theory – Building Up the Case 
 
 
 The thesis of this paper argues that the city put forward the plan for the HHW facility to 
increase its tax revenues through value-free growth, but that residents’ objections were justifiable 
because Northeast Minneapolis residents’ ties to their use value would at risk from the facility.  
What is the growth machine, and what is use value versus exchange value?  To unpack these 
contentions, it is necessary to understand the foundational theory contributing to this case, the 
perspective of political economy of place. 
13
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 Political economy of place: land, its values, and those who value it 
 
 The political economy of place perspective puts forward that land is a unique commodity; 
the uniqueness of which is described in two values.  The first value is that land carries with it 
particular attachments by the people who use that land, known as the use value.  These 
attachments range from the emotional – land as ‘home’ – to the practical – land as a place to live 
and exist.  Because of these attachments, the use value of land is not easily transferrable to a 
dissimilar location, and consequently the use value of land is highly sensitive to change in the 
area surrounding it.  Use value of land may increase or diminish as a result of changes to that 
land – adding a garage to a house or having the roof collapse, for instance.  However, use value 
is also affected by outside changes.  An increase in local crime, a decrease in air quality, or the 
construction of a new school in the area will all affect the use value of land profoundly as the 
emotional and practical attachments to that land change according to the situation.  The second 
form of land’s uniqueness is that land is a commodity, and like all commodities it can be bought 
and sold at a price.  This is the exchange value of land.  (Logan & Molotch, 1987) 
 While all land possesses use and exchange values in some way, the actors concerned with 
that land prioritize which value is most important to them differently.  Residents, defined for this 
case as homeowners
4
, prioritize the use value of land more than the exchange value because 
residents typically buy land to live on it
5
.  A resident’s land is their livelihood – part of the wider 
‘triple dream’ of home, land and community.  The derivation of this livelihood comes through a 
transformation of land from a natural state through day to day actions into a place that supports 
the life of the resident.  (Hayden, 2004; Pred, 1984)  Their investment in land is typically 
                                                     
4
 Renters are residents who have different characteristics associated with their use of land, but they are excluded 
from the discussion of this theory because renters are not a significant group of actors in this case study. 
5
 At least during periods of residency when they are not concerned with buying or selling land. 
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substantial, as most of a resident’s assets are fixed to the land they own.  This investment is also 
immobile, since most residents are not multiple-property owners and only live in one place at 
one time.  Because of the high substantiality and immobility of the investment residents make 
into land, and because they derive their livelihood by living on their land, their investment has 
high risk
6
.  Use value, represented as a portion of their total investment in land, is therefore 
sensitive and at risk to change.  (Fischel, 2001; Logan & Molotch, 1987) 
  Non-resident actors, including corporations, utilities, and governments – and who are 
also known as rentiers -, prioritize the exchange value of land.  This is because for them land is 
not being bought to be lived on, and as such the emotional and practical attachments to land are 
minimal.  What matters for actors concerned with exchange value is just that: the value of the 
land in monetary terms.  Additionally, since non-resident actors are primarily not concerned with 
use value, changes in use value – from crime, pollution or the like – tend to be negligible risks 
for their investment.  The non-resident actors who, operating at a larger geographic scale, 
possess the most influence are those with substantial capital and a diversity of land ownership.  
Consider a development firm or a city government, for example, which possess large sums of 
capital and large amounts of land.   As a result of possessing substantial capital and diverse land 
holdings, the investment of non-resident actors into any one piece of land is usually insubstantial 
compared to the whole of their wealth.  Furthermore, because they possess multiple pieces of 
land, they can move a desired land use from place to place with relative ease.  This low 
substantiality and high mobility means that the investment risk of any one piece of land is low.  
Risk does exist however, and the specifics of this risk are detailed later on.  (Fischel, 2001; 
                                                     
6
 Risk is defined here as the likelihood that the value – use or exchange – of land will decrease while in the 
ownership of the purchasing agent and that this decrease will have a substantial impact on the recoupment of the 
initial investment (Fischel, 2001)  
15
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Logan & Molotch, 1987)  Table 1 broadly illustrates the characteristics of these two actors and 
their relationship with land.   
  
Table 1 – Characteristics of actors’ relationship with land 
Actor 
Mobility of 
investment 
Substantiality 
of investment 
Concern with 
use value 
Concern with 
exchange 
value 
Risk to 
investment 
Residents Low High High Low High 
Non-
Residents 
High Low Low High Low 
 
 So far the political economy of place perspective establishes definitions of use value and 
exchange value, their importance to different actors, and the relative risk associated with land 
investment for both types of actors.  The next theoretical piece that is necessary to understand is 
the concept of the growth machine. 
 Capitalism is predicated under the Schumpeterian principal of creative destruction.  New 
growth is based on the destruction of what came before.  Because new growth brings wealth to 
those who have invested in that growth, the system perpetuates itself for as long as the investors 
benefit from growth.  In short, this is the growth machine.  A fundamental component of the 
growth machine is the concept of value-free growth, where growth in any form is perceived as a 
public good.   Growth machines tend to be put into place and operated by local elites – 
corporations, utilities and governments, for instance – for their own benefit, but in the process 
bring benefits to the surrounding community, through jobs, infrastructural improvement, and the 
like.  Over the course of time, the concept of the growth machine has become engrained into the 
structures of public life as a legitimate means of using space.  (Logan & Molotch, 1987; Pred, 
1984)  Because this is normally how growth machines are perceived by the public – as being a 
hegemonic public good – they continue to perpetuate.  Normally.  There are important 
exceptions though where the hegemony of value free growth is challenged, and the case of the 
16
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HHW facility is one such exception.  To understand how it is an exception though, the theory of 
NIMBYism must be introduced into this discussion of theory. 
 NIMBYism: minimizing risk to use value 
 
 
 NIMBYism, which means ‘not in my back yard’, is the concept of group opposition to a 
given development in a local area, usually due to the development’s perceived negative 
externalities.  NIMBYism was first coined in the 1980s, and has since entered into both the 
academic and mainstream vocabulary, usually as a pejorative associated with intolerant, short-
sighted and obstructionist opposition by residents.  (McClymont & O’Hare, 2008)  These 
criticisms arise when NIMBYs oppose seemingly innocuous or even beneficial development.  
However, NIMYBism is a rational and defensible principle when understood in the context of 
what is at stake for NIMBYs.  NIMBYs are almost exclusively residents, though NIMBYs may 
coordinate with non-resident actors to further their opposition.  Because NIMBYs are residents, 
and because residents have high investment risk associated with their land, residents want to 
keep that risk to a minimum.  (Fischel, 2001)  How then is risk minimized?  To answer this, it is 
necessary to interpret NIMBYism in the context of the political economy of place perspective. 
 Residents invest in their land under a certain set of assumptions.  Namely, that their 
investment is not going to excessively depreciate over time.  Residents can directly control how 
their land depreciates in use value by making improvements to and maintaining their land
7
.  This 
preserves their livelihood within the parameters of their land itself.  However, changes to the 
surrounding area are not directly controllable by residents, and consequently any depreciation in 
use value, in this context, is outside their control.  Therefore, residents want stability more than 
they want change, because change can negatively affect use value, and consequently affect their 
                                                     
7
 Residents rarely seek to depreciate the use value of their land.  Consequently, it can be assumed that any action 
taken on their part would be towards minimizing or countering depreciation of use value. 
17
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livelihood.  It is true that not all change is bad, but residents are not concerned with whether 
change is good or bad.  To residents, the risk to their livelihood presented by possible negative 
change always outweighs the risk to their livelihood presented by no change at all.  Use value 
reflects not just what is happening on the land now, but the odds of what will happen in the 
future as well.  Therefore, even the perception of risk can bring about depreciation in use value.  
(Fischel, 1990; Fischel, 2001)  Table 2 illustrates the different ways in which residents 
experience risk to the use value of their land, and subsequently, to their livelihood. 
 
Table 2 – Residents’ control over change in land use and risk posed to use value by change 
 Direct Change Indirect Change Stability (No Change) 
Residents’ Control High Low Dependent 
Risk to use value Low High Low 
 
 A resident’s control over the stability of their land depends on how vigilant they are 
about opposing development.  The most successful residents are those who are well-connected 
with one another in organizing opposition, who are well-informed of the details of any proposed 
change in land use around their land, and who are frequently present and vocal in their 
opposition.  (Heiman, 1990)  Among the most successful NIMBY campaigns ever was the work 
of Jane Jacobs and others in New York City during the 1960s to combat the many public works 
projects of Robert Moses and other city planners.  These efforts, from stopping the renovation of 
Washington Square Park to stopping the construction of the Lower Manhattan Expressway, 
involved a large network of New York residents in various capacities – lawyers, printers, 
mothers, journalists – all collaborating with one another to publicize the perceived damaged that 
these city plans would have on the livelihoods of residents.  The triumph of NIMBYism in this 
case was a watershed moment in changing public perception of the growth machine from it being 
18
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an inevitable force for the greater good to being a thing that is not universally benign and can be 
opposed.  (Alexiou, 2006)   
 NIMBYism centers on minimizing risk to use value and livelihood for residents.  As 
mentioned earlier, risk also exists for non-resident actors, though in a different sense.  Non-
resident actors tend not to be NIMBYs, since they do not prioritize use value as highly as they 
prioritize exchange value.  Also, the diffuse, mobile investment of non-resident actors translates 
into lower risk.  Exchange value benefits non-resident actors most when, at the time of 
disinvestment, it has increased from the initial investment.  This increase depends on growth, i.e. 
something happening on the land to make it more valuable.  It is therefore in the best interest of 
non-resident actors to do something to the land they have invested in to increase exchange value, 
even if this in turn decreases use value for surrounding residents.  Stability of exchange value is 
antithetical for non-resident actors, since they derive nothing from not growing their investment.  
The higher the exchange value, the better off the non-resident actor who invested in the land 
initially is.  For a non-resident actor, their risk is land not gaining exchange value from initial 
investment to disinvestment.  (Fischel, 2001; Logan & Molotch, 1987) 
 To reiterate, residents seek to minimize the risk that first, their land will depreciate in use 
value, and second, that their livelihoods will be negatively impacted as a consequence.  Non-
resident actors must put forward growth to increase the exchange value of the land they have 
invested in so they gain more at the time of disinvestment.  Not doing so would mean risking a 
loss of investment.  For residents though, this growth represents a risk that the use value of their 
land might depreciate.  In response to this possible depreciation and loss of livelihood, they 
oppose growth through NIMBYism.  NIMBYism manifests itself when residents understand 
19
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what growth will occur that will impact their use value and organizing themselves to oppose that 
growth.   (Fischel, 2001; Heiman, 1990; Logan & Molotch, 1987)   
 NIMBYism - understood here through the terms established from the political economy 
of place perspective - provides a broad understanding of why non-resident actors favor growth 
and why residents oppose growth.  However, the specifics of the case of HHW facility are more 
nuanced than NIMBYism alone can explain.  The HHW facility and industrial land use in 
general carry a negative connotation in people’s minds as a land use, and rightly so since these 
land uses disproportionately depreciate residents’ use values in relation to other forms of growth, 
like other residential land use or commercial land use.  Understanding how and why industrial 
growth is particular in this way requires an investigation of environmental justice. 
 
 Environmental Justice: industry, depreciation of value, and stopping both 
 
 
 Environmental justice is defined for this case as the principle that all people and 
communities are entitled to equal protection of environmental and public health laws and 
regulation.  (Bullard, 1996)  What, though, are these laws protecting against?  The short answer 
is environmental degradation.  The long answer is that environmental justice protects against and 
fights the abuse by industries of the environment and the depreciation of livelihoods of residents 
proximate to those industries.  Before that is discussed though, a definition of industrial land use 
is required. 
 Industrial land use has many definitions.  In the planning context of the city of 
Minneapolis, industry is divided into three land use categories: I-1, light industry; I-2, medium 
industry; and I-3, general industry.  (City of Minneapolis, 2006a)  These descriptors by 
themselves define almost nothing, other than that each category is successively more intensive in 
20
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its land use.  Definitions from other sources provide more information.  Light industry tends to 
be consumer-oriented and has a small environmental impact.  (O’Sullivan & Sheffrin, 2007)  
General industry, otherwise known as heavy industry, lacks a specific definition, but this case 
study uses the definition that general industry is the opposite of light industry.  General industry 
tends to produce goods for or to service other industries, and have the greatest impact on the 
environment of any industrial land use.  The characteristics of medium industry fall in between 
those of light and general industry.  Because the HHW facility is zoned I-3, or general industry, 
it can be inferred that it has a high environmental impact relative to light and medium industrial 
land uses.  Bearing this high impact in mind, it is now time to delve into the details of 
environmental justice. 
 Environmental justice calls for the elimination of environmental disparities and hazards 
that disproportionately impact communities.  Studies show that hazardous waste facilities, like 
the HHW facility in Northeast Minneapolis, tend to be sited in areas with communities already 
experiencing risk to their livelihoods, and that these communities as a consequence shoulder a 
disproportionate amount of the burden on the environment relative to other surrounding 
communities.  (Boone et al., 2009; Bullard, 1996; Coburn, 2003; Lejano & Iseki, 2001)  The 
process of how and the reason why residents desire environmental justice where they live can be 
understood through the political economy of place. 
 It has been established that non-resident actors wish to minimize the risk to their 
investment in land by putting forward growth to increase the exchange value of that land.  
Residents desire to minimize the risk to the use value of their land by opposing this growth.  It 
has also been established that the growth machine is dependent on growth being perceived as a 
public good.  Growth tied to industrial land use complicates the notion of growth for the public 
21
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good however, since industrial land use can produce serious and visible damages to the 
livelihood of residents and non-resident actors alike.  Activism and science in recent years have 
exposed the severe dangers posed to human livelihoods by pollution and environmental 
degradation.  (Wolch, 2007)  Generally, environmental degradation leads to a collapse of vital 
natural systems – the water cycle, food production, etc.  Consequently, environmental 
degradation is sought to be avoided.  (Wheeler, 1998)   
 Specific to this case, land contaminated by industrial pollution - or Brownfield land - has 
lower use and exchange value than uncontaminated land - or Greenfield land.  Furthermore 
Brownfield land lowers these values for surrounding properties.  Remediation is necessary for 
land to be worthwhile for residents to use or for non-residents to invest in for the purpose of 
future exchange.  Remediation of Brownfield land is significantly more expensive than 
investment in Greenfield land, since Brownfield land must be brought back to a point of 
usefulness through investment in cleanup, while Greenfield land is already at a point of 
usefulness.  Because of these high costs, the total percentage of all remediation efforts 
undertaken is usually by non-resident actors more often than by residents.  This is because they 
have more assets and operate at over larger areas.  (De Sousa, 2006; De Sousa et al., 2009)  
Figure 1 illustrates the total cost of investing in Brownfield versus Greenfield land. 
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Figure 1 – Total cost of investing in Brownfield versus Greenfield land 
 
 Industrial contamination produces Brownfield land, which requires significant investment 
to be made useful again.  While market logic would predict that no one would invest in 
Brownfield remediation when they could reap greater benefits from investment into Greenfield 
land, land is a limited resource.  As such, two trends appear in the pursuit of environmental 
justice.  The first trend is remediation, or the cleanup of the land to a point where it has equal 
usefulness to Greenfield land.  The second trend, which is of most concern to this case, is 
prevention of contamination.  (De Sousa, 2009)  Preventing contamination of land is uncertain 
work.  After all, how does one stop something from happening that might never occur in the first 
place?  Preventing land contamination therefore centers on risk management.  Within the 
approach of contamination prevention, there are yet another two divergent branches for 
mitigating risk; the first is containment of hazards ex post facto, the second is elimination of 
hazards ex ante facto. 
 Containment of hazards legitimates that certain hazardous substances must be produced 
and disseminated in the public sphere - to either fulfill the livelihoods of residents or to 
23
Truax: Triumph against the machine
Published by DigitalCommons@Macalester College, 2010
24 
 
propagate the growth machine upon which non-resident actors depend - and that these hazardous 
substances must be cleaned up and disposed of after they have been used for their intended 
purpose.  For residents, these hazardous substances include paint, plumbing chemicals, lawn 
fertilizers, and the like – in short, they constitute household hazardous waste.  For non-resident 
actors, hazardous substances can range from petroleum naphtha used for heating to heavy metals 
used in high-tech scientific research.  Containment of hazardous substances requires the 
construction and operation of facilities designed to handle the waste in a controlled manner.  The 
HHW facility in Northeast Minneapolis is an example of such a facility.  (Isaacs, 2001; Truax, 
2009) 
 Elimination of hazards, on the contrary, does not legitimate that certain hazardous 
substances must be produced and disseminated.  This approach can be summed up in the 
acronym NIABY, or ‘not in anyone’s back yard’.  Rather than uncritically accepting that 
hazardous substances are needed to fulfill livelihoods or propagate growth, NIABYism calls for 
the rethinking and reshaping of production and use of substances so that they are not a hazard to 
the public sphere in the first place.  (Heiman, 1990; Watson & Bulkeley, 2005) 
 Both approaches have benefits and costs, of course.  The benefit of containment is that it 
allows for the use of hazardous substances that are considered necessary for livelihood or for 
growth, provided that after they have fulfilled their usefulness, these substances will be cleaned 
up and disposed of properly.  However, the cost is that this provision is not always followed 
through to completion, and hazardous substances end up contaminating the environment at the 
cost of both use and exchange value.  Northeast Minneapolis alone contains more than 300 
industrial producers of hazardous waste and over 100 sites of industrial contamination, a high 
proportion relative to the rest of the city.  (Truax, 2009)  In order for containment to be 
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successful, facilities must be built to dispose of hazardous waste, and more importantly 
hazardous waste must be safely and reliably brought to these disposal sites for removal.  (City of 
Minneapolis, 2004a; Isaacs, 2001)  The benefit of elimination, through NIABYism, is that it 
keeps hazardous substances from being a risk in the first place by delegitimizing their use for 
livelihoods or for growth.  The cost, though, is that this requires the producers of hazardous 
substances to not produce them in the first place, and for the consumers of hazardous products to 
not consume them.  In short, it requires residents and non-resident actors to make do with non-
hazardous substances to fulfill their livelihood or propagate growth.  (Heiman, 1990)  The next 
component that is necessary to understand is who prefers which method of contamination 
prevention and why. 
 Generally speaking, non-resident actors tend to favor containment.  They benefit from the 
growth associated with the production of hazardous substances, the value of their dissemination 
through sale, and the exchange value tied up in constructing facilities for the disposal of 
hazardous waste.  Residents, particularly NIMBYs and NIABYs, tend to favor elimination.  
They benefit from the complete removal of risk to the use value of their land associated with 
hazardous substances, whereas under containment risk is only removed when containment is 
successfully carried out.  It is important to stress that non-resident actors benefit from both 
approaches to risk prevention, since the risk of Brownfield contamination, and consequently the 
risk to exchange value, is mitigated when either approach is successfully carried out.  However, 
the risk is more substantial under a policy of containment, since containment is not always 
successful and Brownfield contamination may still occur.  True, elimination is not always 
successful as well, but all things being equal, risk is less through elimination than through 
containment. 
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 At this point, the theory of this case has established seven contentions.  First, residents 
prioritize use value because land is their livelihood, while non-resident actors prioritize exchange 
value because land is their means of acquiring wealth.  Second, non-resident actors perpetuate 
the hegemony of value-free growth, because through growth land increases in exchange value 
from the point of initial investment to the point of disinvestment.  Third, there are exceptions to 
this hegemony; principally the NIMBY concept, which centers on opposing growth to minimize 
the potential risk that the use value of a resident’s land might depreciate as a result of growth.  
Fourth, risk also exists for non-resident actors in the form of not increasing exchange value 
above the point of initial investment, and therefore non-resident actors put forward growth as a 
means of ensuring an increased return on their investment into land.  Fifth, growth in industrial 
land use – particularly heavy or general industry - bears disproportionate risk in relation to other 
forms of growth because contamination from industry decreases use and exchange value and is 
costly to remediate.  Sixth, environmental justice seeks to protect those at risk from 
environmental degradation by preventing contamination of land, principally by industry.  
Seventh, environmental justice fulfills this protective role in two ways; the first, favored by non-
resident actors, is the containment of hazardous substances after they have been disseminated 
into the public sphere, and the second, favored by residents, is the elimination of hazardous 
substances before they enter the public sphere.  Having made these contentions, it is time to 
reexamine the thesis of this paper. 
 I argue that the city of Minneapolis put forward the HHW facility to further value-free 
growth and increase its return on exchange values through taxation, and that residents’ objections 
were justifiable because their tie to use value puts them at risk were the HHW facility to be built.  
It is evident at this point - albeit only in general terms - that residents prioritize use value because 
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they derive their livelihood from their land.  Their land is a substantial, immobile investment that 
is subject to high risk, and the preservation of that use value is of utmost importance, lest their 
livelihood be negatively affected.  What is not evident is how the city of Minneapolis benefits 
from exchange values.  To understand this, and to refine the understanding of residents’ 
prioritization of use values to specific terms, it is necessary to understand the political economy 
of place perspective as it relates to scale and spaces of dependence and engagement. 
 
 Scale: where actors act, how actors act, why actors act  
 
 
 How does the city of Minneapolis, or any city for that matter, benefit from exchange 
values?  Taxes!  Cities are essentially whole-scale rentiers, who piggyback upon the gains of 
other, smaller non-resident actors.  By taxing residents and non-resident actors for the use and 
exchange of land, cities receive a percentage of all investments and disinvestments within their 
jurisdiction, and consequently become beneficiaries of the growth machine.  Cities are allowed 
to do this because they have a monopoly on power within their jurisdiction which is legitimated 
through the spending their tax revenues by providing.  (Cox, 1998; Hegel, 1991; Logan & 
Molotch, 1987; Pred, 1984)  Implicit in this power dynamic between the city and those it taxes 
are the issues of spaces of dependence and spaces of engagement.  A space of dependence is 
defined simply as the space in which material wellbeing –livelihood - is realized.  For residents 
and non-resident actors alike, these spaces of dependence are tied to their land.  A space of 
engagement is defined simply as the space where actions transpire protecting the systems that 
allow spaces of dependence to operate.  (Cox, 1998) 
 For residents - viewed within the context of the political economy of place - a space of 
engagement ranges from their land where they exert direct control over the depreciation of use 
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values all the way to the global level where they exert indirect control over the depreciation of 
use values.  For this case study, however, the relevant spaces of engagement extend only to the 
city-wide level.  Similar scales exist for the spaces of engagement utilized by non-resident actors.  
Again for this case study, the relevant spaces of engagement for the non-resident actor in 
question – the city of Minneapolis – extend to the city-wide level. 
 Though land is the space of dependence for both residents and non-resident actors, the 
scale of this dependence differs significantly.  As mentioned earlier, a resident typically does not 
possess more than one piece of land upon which to derive their livelihood.  However, because 
residents prioritize use value, and because use value is sensitive to outside changes, their space 
of dependence must be larger than the land itself.  The realization of their material wellbeing is 
dependent on surrounding spaces not being a source of use value change; commonly, 
depreciation.  Protecting use value from direct change can only be exercised at a scale limited to 
the land itself, and so the space of engagement matches this scale.  Protecting use value from 
indirect change requires ensuring the space of engagement is at a scale that matches the extent to 
which surrounding spaces risk affecting the use value of their land.  Consequently, ensuring no 
change in surrounding spaces requires engaging those surrounding spaces and mitigating the risk 
they pose to the use value of the land in question.  Table 3 illustrates the extent to which spaces 
of dependence and engagement for residents must extend in order to affect direct, indirect and no 
change. 
 
Table 3 – Necessary extent of spaces of dependence and engagement to affect direct, indirect and no change 
 Direct Change Indirect Change Stability (No Change) 
Space of Dependence 
Land itself Surrounding Spaces (Risks) 
Space of Engagement 
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 The methods residents use for mitigating risk are variable from context to context.  Those 
that concern this case are the methods outlined under NIMBYism and environmental justice.  
They include neighborhood education of risks presented by growth and organizing to oppose that 
growth.  In the context of industrial growth, residents organize in opposition of land 
contamination from hazardous waste and argue for the elimination of hazardous substances from 
the public sphere. 
 For non-resident actors like the city of Minneapolis, the space of dependence is their 
taxation jurisdiction, or all the land within the city.  A city, after all, is a non-resident actor which 
is concerned with exchange value more than use value.  Its investment into land does not 
manifest itself specifically through the purchase and sale of land to recoup exchange value, but 
rather manifests itself primarily through taxation
8
.  As a result, the space of engagement for the 
city encompasses all this land, and the purpose of this engagement is to ensure that taxes will 
continue to come into the city coffers.  The structures that allow a city to maintain its monopoly 
on power are based on the assumption that the city uses the benefits of its power – taxes – to 
minimize the risk to exchange values of the land in their jurisdiction.  In this way, the city 
perpetuates the growth machine by using the methods at its disposal to ensure that the non-
resident actors within its jurisdiction experience the highest return on their proper investments 
into land.   Consequently, these non-resident actors pay taxes at an optimal level
9
.  The methods 
in question for ensuring optimal taxes are diverse, but those that are of most concern for this case 
study are the methods by which the city mitigates Brownfield contamination – principally 
through waste management.  (Cox, 1998; Logan & Molotch, 1987; Pred, 1984) 
                                                     
8
 Cities do purchase and sell land, but a city never owns a majority of the land in its jurisdiction. 
9
 Optimal level is the state where non-resident actors receive an uninhibited return on investment in land.  Non-
optimal level is the state where the return on investment is inhibited, say by Brownfield contamination. 
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 Additionally, this circle of taxation and service provision benefits residents as well, who 
experience a minimization of risk to use value because the city – operating at a larger scale space 
of engagement than they – mitigates those risks through service provision.  In return, residents 
fulfill their livelihoods and pay taxes at an optimal level.  The city is not majorly concerned with 
protecting use value though.  This is because the city only stands to lose tax revenue when use 
value is at risk, and cannot gain more than a maximum amount when use value is not at risk.  
Figure 2 illustrates the difference in theoretical tax revenue in relation to risk for non-resident 
actors and residents. 
 
 
 
Figure 2 – Tax potential of different actors in relation to risk 
 
Because the city stands to gain more in taxes from ensuring non-resident actors experience less 
risk than from ensuring the same for residents, the city concentrates its efforts accordingly.  
However, because the actions of the city are not monolithic, i.e. they do not benefit only one 
group of actors over another, residents perpetuate the power monopoly of the city since they too 
benefit from the perpetuation of the growth machine. Without the city providing services from 
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taxation, exchange value and use value would be at risk.  Therefore, risk mitigation would be up 
to individual residents and non-resident actors who typically operate at scales too small to 
effectively do that.  (Logan & Molotch, 1987)  Figure 3 illustrates the relationship between the 
city, residents and non-resident actors in terms of risk mitigation, service provision and taxation. 
 
 
 
Figure 3 – Relationship between city, residents and non-resident actors  
 
 Before moving on, in addition to the seven contentions outlined earlier, the issue of scale 
presents two new contentions.  The eighth contention is that, since use value is sensitive to 
indirect change from outside, the spaces of dependence and engagement of residents must extend 
to include surrounding spaces in order to mitigate that risk.  The ninth contention is that cities, as 
non-resident actors possessing a monopoly on power in their jurisdiction (read: space of 
dependence), act to propagate the growth machine to increase their tax revenues and in turn 
legitimate their power over their jurisdiction (read: space of engagement). 
 This entire relationship between the city, residents and non-resident actors assumes that 
the propagation of the growth machine in turn mitigates risk successfully and universally.  
Astride this assumption sits the principal criticism that this case study presents against value-free 
growth – that the actions a city takes to mitigate risk may actually create risk.  Understanding 
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this criticism requires that the nine contentions outlined in this paper be applied to the case.  Now 
it is time to examine how and why the growth machine of the city of Minneapolis was stopped 
from building a household hazardous waste facility by some of the very residents it thought 
would benefit from the facility. 
Analysis – Understanding the Case 
 
 
 Having rigorously illuminated the theoretical framework necessary to understand the case, 
now it is time to do just that.  The second research question of this paper asks why the city 
wanted an HHW facility at all.  Drawing upon the political economy of place perspective, the 
city of Minneapolis wanted an HHW facility to mitigate the risk that household hazardous waste 
would depreciate the value of land from which the city draws its taxes.  The city of Minneapolis, 
as a non-resident actor, prioritizes exchange value.  Growth increases exchange values from 
initial investment to the point of disinvestment, and the city of Minneapolis capitalizes on this 
growth through taxation.  The city of Minneapolis, after all, derives its livelihood not from living 
on land but from taxing the land in its jurisdiction.  Mitigating risk to use value benefits the 
city’s tax revenue only so far as use value is preserved at the point of optimal efficiency for 
taxation.   On the other hand, mitigating risk to exchange value benefits the city’s tax revenue 
from the point of optimal efficiency and above.  Mitigating risk to exchange value, therefore, 
becomes the most lucrative means by which the city can increase its tax revenue and perpetuate 
its monopoly on power. 
 Household hazardous waste, when exposed to the environment, becomes a contaminant 
and valuable Greenfield land depreciates in use and exchange value to Brownfield land.  As a 
consequence, the city garnishes fewer taxes from this contaminated land, and costly remediation 
must be undertaken for the land to return to usefulness.  Because participation in HHW 
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management is low in Minneapolis, the result of residents not having access to the facilities 
which exist in Brooklyn Park and Bloomington, HHW in Minneapolis represents a controllable – 
though currently uncontrolled – risk.  In other words, there is room for improvement.  The HHW 
facility in Northeast Minneapolis would provide a geographically proximate place for residents 
to dispose of HHW, and in turn mitigate the risk of value depreciation through contamination.  
The risk of value depreciation would be unacceptable to the city, since the loss of revenue from 
taxes means that it cannot provide as many services to residents and non-resident actors within 
their jurisdiction.  This would delegitimize their monopoly on power.  No one wants the city of 
Minneapolis to lose its monopoly on power, because the city is uniquely positioned with a space 
of engagement which can mitigate risks too large for individual actors to tackle.  In this vein, the 
HHW facility plan mitigates risks to value – both exchange and use – for all actors in the city 
and should be perceived as a public good under normal circumstances. 
 Once again though, this paper focuses on the abnormal.  The third research question of 
this paper asks why residents objected to the HHW facility.  Under normal circumstances, 
greater access to participation in HHW management would benefit residents.  Not only would 
the city draw more taxes and be able to provide more services - increasing the use value of 
residents’ land - the risk posed to use value by HHW contamination would be mitigated as well.  
This argumentation assumes two things.  First, that the HHW facility would successfully provide 
greater access for participation in HHW management; second, that the HHW facility itself would 
not impact use value in the area surrounding it.  These assumptions are both false. 
 Key to the city’s logic of increasing participation in HHW management is that a 
geographically proximate HHW facility would be accessible by residents without automobiles.  
The HHW facility is sited in between Industrial Boulevard and Highway 280 in Northeast 
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Minneapolis.  Access to this site by public transportation is minimal, since it lies away from bus 
and light rail lines.  Additionally, the site is not easily accessible by foot.  These facts are 
insubstantial though since household hazardous waste is not easily transferable by any 
transportation mode other than private automobile or municipal waste vehicles.  For example, it 
is hard to conceive of anyone bringing old five-gallon paint cans or empty bottles of plumbing 
chemicals on a city bus, and then carrying those things from the bus stop to the HHW facility 
itself.  To wit, the problem with increasing participation in HHW management cannot be solved 
by building a geographically proximate facility.  Access to this facility is still impeded by a 
fundamental lack of transportation.  This analysis invalidates the concept that the planned HHW 
facility would mitigate risk citywide by removing the threat of contamination from HHW from 
the environment.  Of course, the objections of residents are not justifiable based on this point 
alone.  Just because the facility would not be fully accessible is no reason to oppose it – ‘do not 
let the perfect stand in the way of the good’ one might say.  Justifying residents’ objections to the 
HHW facility requires examining the scale of the impact of the facility as a structure. 
   The second assumption is the more serious one that the city makes in this case.  
Contrary to being a benign form of growth, the HHW facility negatively affects the use value of 
the land surrounding it in three ways.  First, use value is more sensitive to change than exchange 
value, and the HHW facility represents a change and consequently a risk to use value.  Second, 
the HHW facility is an industrial property, and as such represents an increase in the percentage 
of industrial properties already present in over-industrialized Northeast Minneapolis, which 
negatively impacts use value.  Third, the HHW facility encourages the dissemination of 
household hazardous waste into the public sphere rather than eliminating waste out right.  As 
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HHW is allowed to disseminate, it presents a risk to use value, which in turn negatively impacts 
use value. 
 Residents in Northeast Minneapolis, like residents anywhere, invested in the land they 
own under a set of existing conditions.  These conditions basically equal that the land would not 
excessively depreciate over time.  They control the depreciation over their land in a direct way, 
but indirectly controlling change requires operating at a space of engagement that is larger than 
the land of any one resident, and requires the space of engagement to encompass all possible 
risks.  The HHW facility is a risk, since it represents change, and change always carries with it a 
risk of negative impact.  The residents of Northeast Minneapolis want stability in the land 
surrounding them, so that change cannot negatively impact their use value and in turn their 
livelihoods.  For the reason that the HHW facility represents a change in the land surrounding 
them, the residents’ opposition to the facility is justified. 
 Furthermore, the HHW facility is an industrial property and industrial properties carry the 
risk of contaminating the surrounding land.  Despite the fact that the HHW is a means of 
containing hazardous waste, it also represents a concentration of hazardous waste whose 
accidental release into the public sphere would be significantly more detrimental to use value in 
the surrounding area.  This concentrated contamination poses a high risk for Northeast 
Minneapolis residents.  Because Northeast Minneapolis residents derive their livelihoods at a 
small scale – their individual pieces of land – concentrated contamination would affect them 
seriously and entirely.  For the city, whose livelihood is diffused across the entire jurisdiction of 
the city, a concentrated contamination in Northeast Minneapolis would only partially affect the 
city.  Northeast Minneapolis therefore bears the burden of all the risk from HHW in the city 
being concentrated in their back yard, as it were.  Though the HHW facility would have 
35
Truax: Triumph against the machine
Published by DigitalCommons@Macalester College, 2010
36 
 
safeguards, the only sure prevention of accidental contamination is that there be no contaminants 
around in the first place.  Neighborhood residents were aware of the risks posed by an accidental 
concentrated contamination when they objected to the facility.  It was one of the key points of 
contention outlined in their meetings with the city.  (WPCIA, 2009)  Northeast Minneapolis 
residents’ objections are founded in NIMBYism, since they argue against the negative impact 
posed to their use value and livelihoods by the HHW facility.  Further evidence of NIMBYism 
comes from Northeast Minneapolis residents highlighting the HHW facility as further unwanted 
industrialization, and in response, organizing to gather information on how to best prevent 
further industrialization.  My own work previously was a result of this NIMBYist organizing for 
information.  (Truax, 2009)  Because of this risk of contamination, the objections of Northeast 
Minneapolis residents are further justified. 
 Finally, the very existence of the HHW facility represents a regressive step in ensuring 
that hazardous waste is removed from the public sphere altogether.  The objections of Northeast 
Minneapolis residents’ follow in the vein of environmental justice by seeking the elimination of 
hazardous substances rather than simply containing them after they have been produced and 
disseminated.   Even if the facility were built, and even if it were successful, it would still leave 
HHW in the public sphere – a potential risk to use value and livelihoods across the city.  By 
objecting to the HHW facility, Northeast Minneapolis residents promote the cause of ensuring 
environmental justice by removing hazardous substances from the entire public sphere, not just 
those who participate in the city’s HHW management efforts.  This would mitigate the risk to 
use value across the city in such a way that HHW would never again present a risk to use value.  
Constructing the HHW facility would only invite the specter of risk that use values would one 
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day be negatively impacted by household hazardous waste contamination.  For this reason, the 
objections of residents are justified. 
 Returning at last to the thesis of this paper, I have argued that the city of Minneapolis put 
forward the plan for the HHW facility in Northeast Minneapolis to increase its return on 
exchange value through the collection of more taxes.  The HHW facility would do this by 
mitigating the risk to exchange value posed by possible contamination from household hazardous 
waste which would reduce the exchange value of land.  I have also argued that the objections of 
Northeast Minneapolis residents against the facility are justified.  This is because their tie to use 
value is at risk because of the HHW facility plan.  The city of Minneapolis is a non-resident actor, 
and like all non-resident actors it experiences risk to its investments in the land.  This risk, 
however, is diffuse and small because the risk to any one piece of land is, for the city, 
insignificant compared to the whole.  By comparison, the residents of Northeast Minneapolis 
experience a much more acute risk to their livelihood.  To summarize, the HHW facility in 
particular would negatively impact the use value of residents’ land because it represents a 
potential change that could depreciate use value for Northeast Minneapolis residents.   
Additionally, the facility poses a risk of unleashing contaminants in a concentrated area, again 
depreciating use value for residents.  Finally, the HHW facility encourages the dissemination of 
possible contaminants throughout the city which would negatively impact use value for residents, 
not only in Northeast Minneapolis, but throughout the city.  The HHW facility therefore 
represents a significant and concentrated risk to the livelihoods of residents, while only 
marginally benefiting the city in mitigating an already small, diffuse risk. 
 The plan for the HHW facility failed on the one hand because the property owner of the 
site desired by the city refused to sell.  On the other hand and upon deeper examination, it is 
37
Truax: Triumph against the machine
Published by DigitalCommons@Macalester College, 2010
38 
 
apparent that the reason how and why the plan failed can only be understood through the 
political economy of place perspective.  The plan for the HHW facility is seated in the political 
economy of place perspective – a plan by a non-resident actor to increase exchange values 
through value-free growth.  The objections against this facility by Northeast Minneapolis 
residents are seated in NIMBYism and environmental justice – objections for stability of 
surrounding land use, against further risky industrialization, and against the dissemination of 
hazardous substances.  These objections are also seated in the political economy of place 
perspective – objections against risks to the use value and livelihoods that residents derive from 
their land.  In the end, because the plan puts residents at risks more than it benefits them, their 
objections are justified. 
 This is the case of the household hazardous waste facility in Northeast Minneapolis, put 
forward by the city as value-free growth, and stopped by residents who objected to the risk it 
would cause them.  It is now time to conclude this paper, and discuss how this case can be used 
in application to broader themes of theory. 
 
Conclusion – The Case in a Larger Context 
 
 
 The fourth and final research question of this paper asks how the victory of use value 
over exchange value examined in this case can be applied to larger processes beyond 
Minneapolis.  The answer comes in two parts.  The first part is that it furthers the 
NIMBY/environmental justice concept of arguing against value-free growth.  The second part is 
that it broadens – and critiques – the political economy of place perspective. 
 NIMBYism and environmental justice were not the products of spontaneous 
demonstration, but were instead built up in the public consciousness as problem after problem 
began to be systematically opposed by those whom the problems affected.   These reactions 
38
Cities in the 21st Century, Vol. 2 [2010], Iss. 1, Art. 9
http://digitalcommons.macalester.edu/cities/vol2/iss1/9
39 
 
continue to gain support today as the potentially damaging structures which support the growth 
machine are viewed with increased skepticism and objection.  In this sense, the individual 
actions of NIMBYs and those seeking environmental justice aggregate together to form a 
coherent voice questioning growth.  The residents of Northeast Minneapolis, in objecting to the 
HHW facility, add to that voice. 
 The victory of use value over exchange value in this case also impacts the way the 
political economy of place perspective is conceived.  This perspective puts forward value-free 
growth as hegemonic, but clearly in this case value-free growth does not prevail.  Stability 
through no growth and the preservation of use value ends up being the dominant action.  
Therefore, the emphasis placed on growth in this perspective does not hold true.  There are 
exceptions to the hegemony of value-free growth – important ones that need to be incorporated 
into this theory of political economy of place. 
 This case also critiques the political economy of place perspective since it is lacking in 
several descriptive measures.  The theory does not take into account individual or group agency, 
which was addressed here through NIMBYism and environmental justice.  Actors who resist the 
growth machine and the actions they take in resistance can only be described in a dichotomy in 
the political economy of place perspective.  The actions of actors are prescribed only along one 
of two paths – either prioritizing use value or prioritizing exchange value.  What of those who 
prioritize both, or neither?  This case demonstrates that while the political economy of place 
theory is useful in analyzing the actions of different actors, it is not perfect. 
 To end, the case of the household hazardous waste facility in Northeast Minneapolis is a 
valuable interpretation of the political economy of place perspective, not only because the theory 
helps us to understand the case but because the case elaborates the theory.  This case also 
illustrates important critiques of the theory.  The grim, winter scene in the industrial city which 
began this paper is unreal, it has turned out.  The failure of the city has become a boon for 
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residents, secure now that their livelihoods will not be impacted by the value-free growth 
represented by the facility.  Their opposition has furthered the cause of anti-growth criticisms, 
protected use values elsewhere, and revealed that value-free growth spurred by the growth 
machine may not be inevitable after all. 
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